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Behaviour in the first three years of auctions for Pakistani treasury bills is studied. 
Bidding strategies rapidly converged to a consistent pattern after the auctions started in 
1991. Factors that influenced the expected profitability of auction participation are 
identified.  Auction participation was on average low and did not differ between types of 
bidders.  Prices bids are found to reflect both ‘buy and sell’ and ‘buy and hold’ strategies, 
and were affected by risk considerations and bidder-specific variables.  The Pakistani 
experience suggests the robustness of auctions as a market-based allocation mechanism, 
and their value in public debt management. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Auctions represent a paradigmatic example of a market-based mechanism for 
the allocation of resources, albeit one characterised by asymmetric information and 
imperfect competition, and they have therefore long attracted the attention of 
economists.1  In monetary terms, some of the most important auctions are those for 
government securities, which have now become common not only in the 
industrialised countries, but also in developing and transition countries as diverse as 
Jordan, the Czech Republic, Kenya, Mexico, and of course Pakistan.  One aim of the 
present paper is to provide evidence on the functioning of a system of government 
securities auctions, in particular those that have recently been established in 
developing countries. 
For Pakistan the introduction of a regular series of treasury bill auctions was 
part of a wide-ranging programme of financial sector liberalisation, and a move away 
from traditional, non-transparent means of government debt management towards a 
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market-based approach.  The other main aim of this paper is to assess whether the 
auctions worked well for Pakistan, or whether they raised the cost of government 
borrowing unnecessarily or otherwise functioned unsatisfactorily. 
After this introduction, the second section provides background on Pakistan’s 
financial sector reform programme that started in the early 1990s, and the 
institutional arrangements for the treasury bill auctions. The third section describes 
the data set and presents some stylised facts about the evolution of the auctions.  In 
Section Four, the profitability of participating in the auctions is estimated so as to 
establish the average cost to the government of conducting the auctions, and 
profitability is compared across bidders to detect evidence of abnormal returns. 
Profitability rates are then related to the explanatory variables suggested by the 
auction theory.  The fifth section looks at the average prices bid and presents an 
attempt to identify their determinants, before the last section concludes. 
 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
MARKET IN PAKISTAN 
 
Financial Sector Reform in Pakistan2 
For most of the period since independence, the Pakistani financial system has 
been subject to direction and control by government. All commercial banks in 
Pakistan were nationalised in 1974, and a system was instituted to channel funding to 
priority areas of development at controlled interest rates. Treasury bills were 
available, but they were sold on tap at a fixed interest rate.  By the mid-1980s it was 
increasingly felt that incentives for saving (and for the remittance of savings from the 
large Pakistani community abroad) were inadequate, and that resources were not 
being allocated to the most productive uses.  In addition, the traditional approach to 
public debt management was placed under increasing strain by the government’s 
rising need for domestic financing.3  In response, a programme of domestic financial 
sector liberalisation was launched in 1990–91.4  The establishment of private banks 
was permitted in 1990, foreign banks were allowed to engage in more domestic 
business, and over time two state-owned banks were privatised.  Interest rates were 
liberalised and credit ceilings dismantled. 
In the area of public debt management, a major step was the initiation of  a 
regular series of auctions of government securities: starting in February-March 1991, 
 
2Khan and Aftab (1994) and Ul Haque (1997) provide a more extensive overview of the financial 
sector in Pakistan and its reform over the past decade. 
3Total federal government debt had increased from 61 percent of GDP in 1985 to 74 percent of 
GDP in 1990, and domestic government debt rose from 31 percent of GDP to 42 percent of GDP. By 
1990, debt servicing absorbed 39 percent of all government expenditure (State Bank of Pakistan, Annual 
Report, various issues). 
4Liberalisation of the external capital account transactions moved more slowly, and in subsequent 
years was partially reversed. 
Profitability and Pricing in Treasury Bill Auctions 29
the government began auctioning 6-month bills (the focus of attention in this study), 
and bonds with maturities of between 3 and 10 years.  To promote demand for and 
secondary market trading in the new securities, the issuing of securities on tap and 
domestic bearer bonds was discontinued (although foreign currency bonds and 
bearer certificates were introduced), institutional investment in savings schemes was 
limited, and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) raised its rediscount rate on treasury 
bills to 10 percent.  The liquid asset requirement, however, was retained.  At a 
technical level, the new securities were registered in an electronic book entry system 
to facilitate trading.  The SBP, which acted as the government agent in running the 
auctions, designated approximately sixty primary dealers from among the 
commercial banks and other financial institutions, who would bid at the auctions for 
domestic securities either on their own behalf or on behalf of clients, and who would 
subsequently trade in securities with each other and distribute them at a retail level. 5 
Since 1991, these market-based instruments have become the major form of  
domestic government debt.6 
 
Organisation of the Treasury Bill Auctions 
The auctions of six-month treasury bill were conducted according to procedures 
in most respects, similar to those used in other countries but with some peculiarities. 
The auctions, which were held roughly every two weeks, were announced 
approximately one week in advance. Primary dealers and other bank and non-bank 
financial institutions were allowed to submit any number of sealed price-quantity bids 
on their own behalf or on behalf of clients.  All auctions were conducted on a 
discriminatory price basis, so each bid was formulated in the expectation that, if 
accepted, the price bid would be that paid.  After the deadline for bid submission, the 
bids were opened in the presence of the bidders; this rather unusual practice allowed all 
participants to know every bid by bidder.7  The Ministry of Finance would decide on 
the cut-off price after seeing the bids; although notionally the size of the auction issue 
was pre-announced, in practice the cut-off price seems to have been the main decision 
variable and the amount allocated bore little relation to the pre-announced size. The 
setting of the cut-off price was influenced by a number of factors, of which debt 
service costs and the need for funding were most prominent.  On a number of 
occasions the authorities decided to reject all bids, in part because they felt the bids 
were unreasonably low.  This sentiment was expressed by Mr Mohammad Ilyas, 
Director of the Securities Department, SBP, who stated that  
“Out of 48 treasury bill auctions held up to 1st December, 1992 the 
Government had to reject all bids in 6 auctions only due to the fact that 
 
5Carracedo and Dattels (1997) describe the new debt management system in detail. 
6By 1993 treasury bonds and bills constituted one half of domestic federal government debt 
outstanding, excluding that to the SBP. 
7The publication of bids made possible the collection of the data set used in this study. 
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the bidders had quoted much lower prices which were not compatible 
with the market conditions”. 
(Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, 1994). 
 
The extra degree of uncertainty created by the authorities’ inability or 
unwillingness to pre-commit to selling a fixed quantity of bills constitutes a major 
departure from ‘standard’ practice in treasury bill auctions.  Bidders were aware of 
this uncertainty (in addition to uncertainty about the aggregate bid schedule) and 
presumably took it into account when formulating their bidding strategies. 
One or two days after the deadline for bid submission, the auction results 
would be communicated to the participants, and trading in the new bills would begin 
on a ‘when-issued’ basis.8  Settlement would take place three or four days after the 
bids were submitted, and the when-issued trades would settle at the same time. 
Thereafter, the newly issued or ‘on the run’ bills would trade normally in the 
secondary market until the next auction.  The participants in the secondary market 
were essentially the same institutions that participated in the auctions. 
 
III.  SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Data Set and Definitions 
Data were obtained on bidding behaviour and outcomes in the first 84 
auctions of six-month treasury bills, covering a period from February 1991 to May 
1994.  The core of the sample is formed by observations of the price-quantity pairs 
that constituted the bids, each identified by bidder and by auction.  After the deletion 
of a small number of outliers, which mostly seemed to reflect recording errors,9 the 
data set comprised 6506 observations. Data on the cut-off price (designated CO), the 
maturity of each bill issue (which varied slightly around a mode of 183 days), and 
the dates of bid submission and results announcement were also available.10  All 
prices were annualised (harmonising the maturities at 365 days), and logarithms 
taken.11  Then means were estimated by auction and by bidder in each auction; 
below, in examining the prices bid, attention focuses on the weighted mean of the 
annualised log prices bid  by each bidder in each auction (WMP). In addition, the 
standard errors of the prices bid, both by auction and by bidder by auction, were 
calculated as measures of bid dispersion.  Also calculated were the total volume bid, 
the volume of winning bids, the total value of bids and winning bids for individual 
 
8There does not seem to have been significant ‘when-issued’ trading before the deadline, as there 
is, for example, in the U.S. treasury bill market. 
9In the first auction one bidder submitted two very low-priced bids, reportedly because an 
annualised discount factor had been applied by mistake. 
10For auctions where all bids were rejected, a notional cut-off prices is defined at a level 
marginally above that of the highest bid received. 
11Log prices are multiplied by 100 in order to increase the number of significant digits. 
Profitability and Pricing in Treasury Bill Auctions 31
bidders (all in levels and in logarithms), the number of participating bidders and 
successful bidders, and the number of bids. 
The data on bidding behaviour were complemented by those on secondary 
market prices.  In particular, daily data were obtained on both the bid and offer price 
for treasury bills quoted in the Karachi interbank market for the period beginning 
with the twenty-fifth auction, by which time reportedly the secondary market in bills 
had become fairly liquid. The quotes, which were recorded in the course of the 
morning when activity was the heaviest, apply to whatever bill is “on the run”, that 
is, the most recently issued bill.  Thus, the treasury bill offer price up to the morning 
before the deadline for submission of bids for an auction (designated as TBOFF(–1)) 
represents the price at which a potential bidder could buy bills from the previous 
issue; the treasury bill bid price on the day when auction results were announced 
(designated as TBBID(+1)) represents the price at which a winning bidder could sell 
newly-auctioned bills in the when-issued market.  The secondary market bid and 
offer prices were annualised, and logarithms taken.  Other secondary market data 
included the overnight interbank interest rate, which may be taken as a measure of 
the cost of carry for commercial banks of holding treasury bills. 
 
Characteristics of the Auctions and Bidding Behaviour 
An examination of the data allows one to discern some of the main features of 
the auctions and bidding behaviour.  The characteristics of the data, including the 
time-series properties, must also be reviewed in preparation for the econometric 
investigation. 
 
Dispersion of Bid Prices and Volumes 
A typical auction attracted scores of bids from perhaps two dozen bidders, for 
a total value of about Rupees (Rs) 10 billion, and on average about Rs 4 billion was 
sold in each auction.  The shape of the bid schedule typically resembled the mirror-
image of a cumulative distribution function, with a small value of bids at very high 
or low prices and most bids being clustered closely around the cut-off. 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of prices over the course of all 84 auctions in 
the sample. The cut-off price, the weighted mean of the prices bid, and the range of 
bids are shown.  Figure 2 shows the volume of bids and the volume of bids accepted. 
During the first five or six auctions, the range of prices bid was especially great, and 
the average price bid fluctuated around the cut-off.  Presumably during this period 
participants were experimenting with their bidding strategies and learning to 
anticipate the strategies of each other and those of the authorities in setting the cut-
off price.  It is striking, however, that this learning period appears to have been quite 
short, and convergence to what proved to be typical bidding behaviour seems to have 
been achieved in about three months. 
After this initial period, the average price bid was usually slightly below the 
eventual  cut-off  price,  and  the  range  of  bids was typically equivalent to about 80  
Daniel C. Hardy 32
 
 
 
Figure 1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
Profitability and Pricing in Treasury Bill Auctions 33
basis points.  Much of the variation that did occur seems to have originated from the 
authorities, such as on those occasions when they rejected all bids (auctions 16, 19, 
35, 45, 46 and 48). During a period from auction 45 through 62 the authorities 
allowed very little fluctuation in the cut-off price.  As seen in Figure 1, that period 
saw a narrowing of the range of bids received, which also became more asymmetric, 
with a relatively long ‘tail’ of low bids and few bids significantly above the cut-off; 
presumably participants expected that any large deviation from the fixed cut-off 
price would be downwards. Figure 2 illustrates that the volume of bids received, and 
especially the amount allocated, decreased sharply during this period, which 
indicates that the cut-off price had been fixed at too high a level to sustain the 
previous level of funding. 
 
Time-series Properties 
The time-series properties of the series were reviewed.  Most series displayed 
strong autocorrelation at lag 1, and often some correlation at lags 2 and 6.  The serial 
correlation at lag 6, which corresponds to approximately a quarter year with bi-
weekly auctions, may be the product of underlying seasonal influences in the 
Pakistani economy, notably the agricultural cycle and the quarterly payment of some 
taxes, including certain taxes on commercial banks. 
The hypothesis of non-stationarity of the aggregate price series could not be 
rejected in augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Changes in the cut-off price, the average 
price bid, and secondary market prices seem to be very persistent, as is common in 
financial market pricing.12  The possibility of non-stationarity was taken into account 
in estimation by subtracting the previous cut-off price from all prices (all in 
logarithms); the hypothesis of non-stationarity could be rejected for the differenced 
series.13  
 
IV.  BIDDING PROFITABILITY 
 
Definition of Profitability 
The profitability of participating in an auction will be defined as the difference 
between the amount paid to obtain bills and their value in the secondary market a 
short time (specified below) after the auction.  An examination of profitability should 
provide important indicators of how the auction market functions.  First, a finding 
that profitability is relatively low and comparable in magnitude to that observed in 
other government securities auctions, such as those in industrialised countries, would 
 
12The prices of the bills need not follow a random walk to be non-stationary or sufficiently close 
to non-stationary to present estimation issues in the limited sample available. 
13The previous cut-off price should be well-known to market participants when they prepare their 
bids and in secondary market trading immediately before each auction. Individually differencing each 
series, including the average bid by bidder, would be problematic given the panel structure of the data set, 
especially because many bidders participated only sporadically. 
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be one indicator that the auction mechanism is working well and is not in itself 
adding significantly to the government’s funding costs.  Second, differences in the 
profitability rates obtained by different bidders can provide evidence on the degree 
of competition in the auctions, and whether or not some bidder or groups of bidders 
have monopoly power and are bidding relatively aggressively.  Third, hypotheses 
derived from auction theory might be testable by relating profitability to certain other 
features of the auctions and bidders. 
The available data allowed the calculation of the realised profits and the profit 
rate obtained by each successful bidder from auction twenty-five onwards.  Suppose 
that a certain bidder b in some auction a submits a schedule of n price-quantity pairs 
{(pba1, qba1), ..., (pban qban)}, the realised cut-off price is ca, and on the day following 
the auction the bid price for treasury bills in the when-issued market is bida(1) (all 
prices are in absolute terms). Then the bidder’s profit PF1ba merely from buying in 
the auction and selling immediately is 
∑∑
≥≥
−=
abaiabai cp
baibai
cp
baiaba qpqbidPF .)1(1  … … … (1) 
This equation can usefully be rewritten as 
( ) ( )∑∑
≥≥
−−−=
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baiabai
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baiaaba qcpqcbidPF  )1(1  
which shows that the profit obtained in such a discriminatory price auction equals the 
profit in a comparable uniform-price auction (that is, the difference between the 
when-issued market price and the cut-off price, multiplied by the amount won), less 
the value of the ‘upper tail’ of bids that exceed the cut-off price. The profit rate will 
be defined as the ratio of profits to the total value won, or 
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It may be unreasonable to assume in the context of the early development of 
secondary trading in Pakistani government securities that a significant participant in 
the auction could sell all the bills he had won on a single day in the when-issued 
market without drastically depressing the price.  As a more moderate alternative, 
profits and profit rates were calculated assuming that each bidder sold the bills won 
in equal tranches in the course of the five days following the auction.  On the first 
two of these days, trading would have been conducted on a when-issued basis, so 
there is no cost of carry, but cost of carry needs to be deducted from profits on the 
following three days; the offer rate on interbank loans was used as a proxy for the 
cost of carry. Thus, if the daily interbank rate on day t is denoted by i(t), the 
        …    … (2) 
Profitability and Pricing in Treasury Bill Auctions 35
alternative measure of profits PF2ba is defined as PF1ba in Equation (1) above, but 
with bida(1) replaced by  
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and similarly an alternative rate of profitability PFR2ba can be defined. 
 
Mean Profit Rates 
Estimates were made of the profits obtained by bidders in the 60 auctions for 
which the necessary secondary market information was available. Total profits 
defined by PF1ba (that is, from buying and selling immediately in the when-issued 
market) amounted to Rs 302 million over these auctions (approximately US$10 
million at the then prevailing exchange rate) on a total value of Rs 267,538 million 
bills sold (with a face value of Rs 283,896 million).  The corresponding overall 
weighted average profit rate PFR1ba was 11.27 basis points.  The weighted mean 
profit rate obtained by selling during the five trading days following each auction 
(PFR2ba) was 13.29 basis points. Thus, mean profitability of participating in the 
Pakistani treasury bill auctions during this period was significantly positive, so in 
that sense bid shading occurred, but the level of profitability seems to have been 
quite low.14  Commercial banks do not seem to have made exceptionally large profits 
at the expense of government merely by participating in the auctions. The two 
measures of profitability move together closely (the correlation between the two 
measures of profitability by bank is 0.854), and both are quite variable (the 
unweighted standard deviation of PFR1ba is 29.64).  On numerous occasions profits 
were negative. 
These profitability rates can be compared with an estimated rate of about 4 
basis points estimated by Cammack (1979) in auctions for three-month U.S. treasury 
bills during the 1970s, and of about 1.5 basis points estimated by Spindt and Stolz 
(1993) for auctions during the 1980s.  While Umlauf (1993) estimates profitability at 
about 1.6 basis points in discriminatory-price auctions for Mexican one-month bills, 
Simon (1994) finds that the profitability of participating in auctions for longer 
maturity U.S. government bonds and following a ‘buy and sell’ strategy can reach 
about 1 basis point.15 Thus, even after allowing for the longer maturity of the 
 
14Another way to look at the issue of bid shading is to consider that, if the same face value of bills 
had been sold in a uniform price auction, the average price bid would have had to be 13.52 basis points 
higher for the same revenue to have been obtained.  Bolten (1973) estimates that if uniform pricing were 
introduced into the U.S. Treasury bill auctions, revenue would be maintained if the quantity of bills 
demand increased by 1 percent.  
15Feldman and Reinhart (1995) find that in IMF gold sales during the 1970s, the mean winning 
price was 12 basis points below the secondary market price when discriminatory pricing was used. 
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Pakistani bills, the observed profitability of auction participation in Pakistan was 
rather greater than the rates observed in the primary market for U.S. government 
securities. The latter market, however, is very deep and supported by an extremely 
liquid and sophisticated secondary market. These structural differences are illustrated 
by the fact that the range of bids in the U.S. primary market and bid-ask spreads in 
the U.S. secondary market are about an order of magnitude smaller than those typical 
of Pakistan during this period. Furthermore, the availability in the U.S. of when-
issued trading before the auction may significantly reduce the risk of participation 
[Viswanathan and Wang (1999)]. It presents an interesting model of a treasury bill 
auction market with when-issued trading. Hence, the higher rate of profitability 
obtained by auction participants in Pakistan may largely reflect the greater risks they 
face.  
The weighted mean profit rates for each bank were estimated, and the 
equality of each bank’s profitability with the weighted average of all other banks 
was tested [the results are available in Hardy (2000)]. Tests were also performed to 
compare profitability between various groups of bidders, namely, foreign versus 
domestic banks, and privately-owned versus public. All the test results suggest that 
profitability did not differ systematically between most bidders, and only very few 
individual banks earned significantly more or less than the remainder. Data on 
profitability give no indication of collusion between any sub-set of bidders. 
However, two publicly-owned banks, including the bank that bid and won the 
greatest volume of bills, did achieve significantly lower rates of profitability. The 
relatively poor performance of the largest bidder can be attributed to a number of 
factors: it may be that, as a publicly-owned institution, its management made less 
effort to maximise profits or felt itself under pressure to hold down the 
government’s borrowing costs, and therefore bid less aggressively. However, 
another plausible explanation is that the bank was hampered by its very size, as 
could occur if it had to maintain an inventory of bills in order to meet retail 
demand or to fulfil its liquid asset requirement, and due to the thinness of the 
secondary market it had to obtain a large volume in the primary market even at a 
relatively high price. Possibly, if this large bank ever acquired surplus bills in the 
auctions, its attempts to dispose of them would depress the secondary market price 
and thus its profits. 
 
Profitability and Auction Theory 
Further insights can be obtained by relating realised profitability to features of 
the individual auctions and the bidders’ behaviour. The search for such relationships 
and their interpretation needs to be informed by auction theory, and indeed it would 
be desirable to test models of bidding behaviour. However, no comprehensive 
theoretical treatment is available of multiple-unit, multiple-bid repeated auctions 
with a resale market, such as treasury bill auctions. In the case of the auctions for 
Pakistani treasury bills, the uncertainty over the amount to be sold presents a further 
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complication. Hence, any hypotheses to be tested can have at best an heuristic basis 
in theory. 
A model of a multiple-unit, multiple-bid auction that seems to fit the Pakistan 
case relatively closely is provided by Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997).  Each bidder is 
assumed to be sufficiently small so that it behaves as a price taker in the auction.16 
For each point along the bid schedule, the bidder’s marginal expected payoff 
depends on the difference between the bidder’s true valuation and the amount paid, 
and the probability of the marginal bid being accepted. The bidder therefore faces a 
trade-off: the bid schedule can be shaded downwards more to increase the payoff 
rate, but the quantity of bills the bidder can expect to win is thereby reduced. This 
trade-off leads even a risk-neutral bidder to shade its bid and earn positive profits; 
risk aversion reduces but does not eliminate bid shading.17 
In the interpretation of the model used here, the payoff from winning may 
depend both on the post-auction secondary market price and other common or 
possibly bidder-specific factors (for example, meeting inventory needs or fulfilling a 
liquid asset requirement). If the secondary market demand for the bills shifts 
upwards, which is associated with an increase in the aggregate amount bid and the 
amount won, then at each possible cut-off price the trade-off between higher profits 
and  the probability of a bid being accepted is unchanged. Hence, expected total 
profits are unaffected, but the rate of profitability decreases due to the increase in the 
volume sold. This reasoning also suggests that if a large volume of bills was sold in 
the previous auction, so that banks are holding a large stock of close substitute for 
the new bills to be auctioned, then profits should be lower. Among other factors 
common to all bidders, the expected cut-off price is clearly a potential determinant of 
profitability, but the relationship is ambiguous: an increase in the expected cut-off 
price decreases both the expected volume won and the ratio of winning bids to total 
bids, and so could either raise or lower the expected profitability rate. 
An upward shift in the bidder-specific demand for bills, which leads a bidder 
to bid more for the same expected secondary market price, reduces its expected 
profits. A bidder that bought a large volume in a recent auction is likely to have 
relatively low demand for new bills, and should therefore make somewhat higher 
 
16This model assumes a downward-sloping demand schedule for each bidder. This assumption 
may be tolerable in the case of the Pakistani treasury bill auctions, because bid-offer spreads in the 
secondary market tended to be quite large (on the order of 50 basis points in terms of annualised yields); if 
a bidder won a quantity of bills such that he would not sell at the secondary market bid price nor buy at 
the offer price, then the total payoff would depend just on the bidder’s individual demand for bills. 
17Some of the hypotheses presented here are consistent with other theories of auction behaviour, 
and in particular with auctions that give rise to the ‘winner’s curse’, whereby on average the winner has an 
over-optimistic prior expectation of the object’s value. To compensate for this risk, bids are shaded 
downwards, and generally expected profits are positive. Greater dispersion of opinion about the true value 
of the object being sold and the cut-off price should lead to greater bid shading.  Bikhchandani and Huang 
(1989) set out a model of a multi-unit auction with a resale market, albeit with bids restricted to unit 
quantities, and show that in general bidders will shade their bids. 
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profits. An individual bank may also on occasion be eager to acquire at least a 
minimum quantity of bills, perhaps to meet inventory needs, and therefore present a 
relatively price-inelastic bid schedule.  A large proportion of bids by such a bank is 
likely to be accepted, and profitability would be reduced. Banks may also differ on a 
sustained basis in how aggressively they bid and the average profits they make in the 
auctions, perhaps due to differences in risk aversion, the importance to them of 
retailing treasury bills, or managerial incentives; such persistent differences can be 
captured econometrically through the inclusion of fixed effects. 
Considerations of risk are likely to be important determinants of bidding 
behaviour and the return on participating in the auction, and in general higher risk 
should be compensated by higher expected return, for a given degree of risk 
aversion. The most important sources of risk for bidders are uncertainty over the 
aggregate demand for bills, uncertainty over the cut-off price that the government 
will set, given aggregate demand, and covariance between returns on bills possibly 
acquired at the forthcoming auction and other assets in the bidder’s portfolio. 
Assessments of risk are not directly observable, so for estimation purposes one needs 
proxies such as the dispersal of bids made by each bidder—and of all bids in an 
auction—and the variability of secondary market prices for bills in the days leading 
up to the auction. 
 
Specification of Regressions on Profitability 
The theoretical literature suggest certain relationships between expected 
profitability and the actual or expected value of other variables. Expectations are not 
observed, but under the assumption of rational expectations realised, the realisation 
of a variable should equal its expectation plus a white noise error term. The 
realisations can be used in estimation, provided that the ‘errors in variables’ are dealt 
with through the employment of instrumental variables. In this case, instrumental 
variables estimation is also advisable in order to remove statistical bias due to 
possible simultaneity between variables.18 These considerations lead to the following 
specification to be used in estimation: 
PFRi = α1SDPBID + α2SDTBOFF +  
            α3AV + α4(AW/AV) + α5AW(–1) + α6V + α7(W/V) + α8W(–1) +  
            Σαfb(fixed effects dummies) + αa28(auction 28 dummy) + (error terms), 
for profitability measures i = 1, 2 achieved by bidder b in auction a.19 The risk 
terms SDPBID is the standard deviation of the log price bid by bidder b in auction 
a, and SDTBOFF is the standard deviation of the secondary market log offer price 
 
18For example, bidders may raise the quantity bid when they expect high profitability, and greater 
dispersion in a bank’s bids in itself may reduce profitability in a discriminatory price auction unless offset 
by ex-ante bid shading. 
19Subscripts are dropped where there is no chance of ambiguity. 
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for treasury bills during the five market days preceding auction a. The levels of 
auction-wide and bidder-specific demand  are captured by AV and V, respectively 
the log volume bid in auction a by all bidders together and by bidder b alone. The 
ratio of winning to total bids for all bidders  (AW/AV) is meant to capture 
aggregate supply effects.20 The equivalent ratio for bidder b (W/V) could capture 
other bidder-specific effects.21 Also possibly relevant are AW(–1), the log volume 
of winning bids in the previous auction, and W(–1), the log volume won by b in the 
most recent auction in which he participated. The fixed effects dummy for each 
bidder b takes the value of 1 in observations relating to b and zero otherwise. The 
dummy for auction 28, which takes the value of 1 for observations from auction 28 
and zero otherwise, is included to capture the (unexplained) circumstances which 
led to very high profits on that one occasion. The instruments used include up to 
six lags of the predetermined variables, plus the dummies, and comprise both 
bidder-specific and auction-wide variables.22  
The principal sample used in estimation consists of all observations for which 
profitability could be calculated, excluding observations that on a priori grounds 
may be expected not to be representative, namely, (i) those from the period when the 
cut-off price was nearly constant, when also the quantity bid and participation 
declined sharply and prices bid converged to the cut-off; and (ii) single bids, that is, 
individual bids submitted mostly by very small and infrequent participants. After 
taking lags to construct instrumental variables, 509 observations are available in this 
restricted sample. Regressions were also run using other samples so as to judge the 
stability of the estimates. 
 
Results of Regressions on Profitability 
The results of regressing profitability on the various explanatory variables are 
presented in Table 1. Included besides the estimated coefficients and standard errors 
and some familiar statistics are the estimated generalised R2 statistic,  which  Pesaran  
 
20The total volume bid and the volume accepted are highly correlated with each other, but the 
level of the volume bid and the ratio of winning to total bids (the win ratio) are not. Therefore, including 
these variables in this form on the right-hand side of the equation to be estimated is econometrically 
advantageous. 
21For example, two bidders may submit the same total volume of bids, but one may submit a more 
concave bid schedule with fewer high- and low-priced bids; under some circumstances the more concave 
bid-schedule could result in a higher proportion of bids accepted, or lower unit costs. 
22The bidder-specific instruments included lags one and two of WMP, SDPBID, V, and W, and the 
dummy variables for all the banks that were awarded bills during these auctions. The auction-wide 
instruments include the first lag of CO, AWMP, ASDPBID, AV, AW, and AW/AV, and in addition lags two 
and six of AWMP and AV. The employment of longer lags of only two of the aggregate variables was 
motivated by the need for parsimony, given the relatively small number of auctions in the sample, and 
inspired by the results of Phillips and Hansen (1990), who suggest that the inclusion of numerous highly 
correlated instruments (especially when they are cointegrated) brings little gain in efficiency. Additional 
instruments included the dummy variable for auction 28, and known pre-determined variables SDTBOFF 
and TBOFF(–1). 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Profit Rates 
Dependent Variable PRF1 PRF1 PRF1 PRF1 PRF2 
Estimation Method IV IV IV OLS IV 
 Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
SDPBID 58.488 46.439 24.187 1.321 38.924 
 (20.040)** (17.122)** (10.850)* (6.614) (18.191)* 
SDTBOFF 51.995 54.527 54.223 51.604 83.283 
 (6.412)** (5.950)** (4.864)** (4.793)** (6.321)** 
AV 21.168 20.890 13.429 13.127 19.272 
 (4.090)** (4.002)** (1.934)** (1.770)** (4.252)** 
AW/AV –64.097 –37.583 –34.909 –52.591 –19.782 
 (23.141)** (8.135)** (6.031)** (4.060)** (8.643)* 
AW(–1) –2.572 –2.942 –2.924 –2.498 –4.262 
 (0.768)** (0.692)** (0.581)** (0.571)** (0.735)** 
V –20.219 –22.471 –2.722 –2.969 –20.387 
 (6.927)** (6.546)** (1.458)+ (1.615)+ (6.954)** 
W/V 31.721 – – – – 
 (25.843) – – – – 
W(–1) 5.419 5.825 3.656 2.992 7.297 
 (1.502)** (1.436)** (1.143)** (1.036)** (1.526)** 
AUC28 69.219 72.294 68.321 54.572 37.923 
 (12.055)** (11.557)** (8.965)** 7.186** (12.278)** 
Number of 
Observations 509 509 509 535 509 
Mean of Dependent 
   Variable 13.845 13.845 13.845 13.845 13.751 
Standard Deviation of 
Dependent Variable 29.457 29.457 29.457 29.457 32.101 
R2 0.370 0.384 0.464 0.562 0.400 
Generalised R2 0.436 0.434 0.367 – 0.444 
E’PZ*E 35101 32484 62303 – 31079 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  **: significant at 1 percent; *: significant at 5 percent; +: significant at 
10 percent. 
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and Smith (1994) argues is a good measure of fit for an instrumental variables 
regression, and the term E’PZ’E, which is the instrumental variables equivalent of 
the sum of squared residuals.23 
The regression results corroborate the hypotheses presented above.  Looking 
at the principal specification for profitability measure 1 (Column 1), the risk terms 
both enter with positive and highly significant coefficients; it seems that bidders 
require compensation for both the risk manifest in the dispersion of their bids and 
that represented by fluctuations in the secondary market price of treasury bills. An 
increase in the total volume bid, that is, strong aggregate demand for bills, is 
associated with higher profits, and profits tend to be lower, the greater the proportion 
of this demand that is met (the supply effect). When a large volume of similar bills is 
outstanding, because a large volume was awarded in the previous auction, the reward 
to acquiring new bills is the less. Turning to the bidder-specific quantity terms, a 
bidder who submits a relatively large volume of bids tends to achieve low 
profitability, but the proportion of bids accepted has only a weak positive effect on 
profitability (this term is therefore dropped from subsequent specifications). The 
lagged volume won has a positive effect on profits, suggesting that a bidder holding 
a relatively large inventory of similar bills will bid more aggressively and earn 
higher profits on the bills that are in fact won. Results for profitability measure 2 
(shown in Column 5) are similar. 
The fixed effects are jointly significant.24,25 Nonetheless, when they are 
excluded from the specification (see Column 3 of Table 1), most other estimated 
coefficients are not greatly affected; the most important change is that the coefficient 
on the individual volume term becomes much smaller absolutely, and less 
significant, and the estimated coefficients on the other bidder-specific explanatory 
are also lowered.  Estimating the model by OLS generally reduces the magnitude and 
significance of the estimated coefficients, especially those on bidder-specific 
variables and those that are not predetermined, such as the dispersal and volume of 
bids.  Results are robust to changes in the sample; results for regressions on the full 
sample including singleton bids and the period of a fixed cut-off price, and on a 
sample including only the last 22 auctions [available in Hardy (2000)], do not differ 
substantially from those presented here. 
 
V.  PRICES BID 
The explanations presented and tested above for the measured profitability of 
participating in the auctions, which are formulated primarily in terms of quantities, 
 
23Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of the standard errors [White (1980)] were calculated, 
but the significance of estimated parameters was not greatly affected when they were employed. 
24The relevant test statistic is 9.756, which has an F(43,457) distribution and is highly 
significantly different from zero. 
25The regressions were run with the fixed effects replaced with dummy variables identifying 
groups of bidders, such as public sector banks, foreign banks, or small bidders. Almost all the estimated 
coefficients on these dummies were insignificantly different from zero. 
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suggest that profitability will depend on aggregate demand and supply conditions, 
and on idiosyncratic factors. These factors have also implications for the level of the 
prices bid, so that for example strong demand or anticipated limited supply for bills 
will tend to raise both profitability and prices bid. The interpretation of the results of 
the profitability regressions can be checked by examining the relationship between 
prices bid and the same explanatory variables. 
This approach, however, needs to be complemented by a more general 
examination of the determinants of bidding behaviour. In particular, one may ask 
whether bidders determine their bid schedules in order to maximise profitability of 
buying in the auction and immediately thereafter ‘marking to market’ their positions, 
or whether they have other objectives, such as maximising returns over the longer 
term; the question is whether bidders are following a ‘buy and sell’ or a ‘buy and 
hold’ strategy.  Under the ‘buy and sell’ strategy, prices bid should be determined by 
the expected secondary market price following the auction, the expected cut-off, and 
measures of risk (insofar as they are not already incorporated in prices). Under the 
‘buy and hold’ strategy, prices bid should be determined by the expected cut-off 
price, the price of substitute assets in the bidders’ investment portfolio, and risk 
measures.  A third possibility is that bidder-specific factors determine the prices bid. 
The approach taken here to assessing the relative importance of the three 
explanations is to estimate the relationship of prices bid to, respectively, the expected 
secondary market price, the price of outstanding treasury bills issued in the most 
recent auction (which are the closest substitute for the bills to be issued), and the 
bidder-specific variables such as the individual quantity bid, in addition to the risk 
measures and the expected cut-off price.  Note that, in the absence of rationing, price 
terms should capture the information relevant for the determination of bidding 
behaviour, and so one would expect that aggregate quantity variables would not be 
significant explanatory variables. 
Bidders cannot know the cut-off price and the subsequent secondary market 
value of bills when they determine their bid schedules, but must base their bids on 
expectations, which are unobserved.  For estimation purposes, the realised values of 
these variables can be used, provided that an instrumental variables technique is 
employed in estimation. The need for instrumental variables estimation is also 
motivated by the possible simultaneity between prices bid and certain candidate 
explanatory variables, such as the spread of bids. 
With these motivations, the principal specification for the pricing of bids was 
chosen to take the form 
 
WMP = β1ASDPBID + β 2SDTBOFF +  
             β 3TBBID(+1) + β 4CO + β 5TBOFF(–1) +  
β 6V + β 7(W/V) + β 8W(–1) +  
             Σ β fb(fixed effects dummies) + β a28(auction 28 dummy) +           
(error terms), 
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where WMP is the weighted mean of the log annualised prices bid by bidder b in 
auction a. The risk terms are SDTBOFF, as before, and ASDPBID, which is the 
weighted standard deviation of all prices bid in auction a.26 The term TBBID(+1) 
denotes the treasury bill bid price (how much one can sell a bill for) in the when-
issued market on the day following auction a, CO is the cut-off price in the 
auction, and TBOFF(–1) is the treasury bill offer price (how much one must pay to 
acquire a bill issued in the previous auction) immediately before bids must be 
submitted. The bidder-specific terms (volume bid, winning ratio, past winning 
volume, and fixed effects) are the same as in the profitability regressions. 
Regressions were also performed including the other explanatory variables from 
the profitability regressions. The main sample is again that excluding singleton 
bids and the period of a stable cut-off price, but there are more observations (740 
after construction of the instruments) because the average prices bids from 
unsuccessful bidders are also included. The instruments used are the same as in the 
profitability regressions. 
Results are presented in Table 2. The first column shows the estimated 
coefficients from a regression of average prices bid just on the variables used to 
explain variations in profitability. The most prominent but perhaps unsurprising 
result is that bidders who can be expected to be awarded a high share of their bids 
relative to the average also bid relatively high prices. When a high aggregate volume 
is bid or when a low volume was sold in the previous auction, then average prices 
bid is higher, presumably because bidders anticipate a higher price in the subsequent 
secondary market. An individual bidder that bids for a large volume, or that won 
relatively little the last time it participated in an auction, also tends to bid higher, 
although these effects are not statistically significant. A high spread of bids, 
indicating more uncertainty about the auction outcome, is associated with lower 
prices, but the coefficient on the standard deviation of past secondary market prices 
enters with the wrong sign. 
The inclusion of price terms improves the explanatory power of the regression 
considerably (Column 2), and eliminates the statistical significance of  most quantity 
terms; the (expected) prices convey more information than the quantities. Of the 
quantity terms, only the win ratios and the individual volume bid were found to be 
significant; the standard deviation of prices bid by all bidders was found to be more 
significant than the equivalent measures for individual bidders. 
The results of estimating a relatively parsimonious specification are shown in 
Column 3. Columns 4 and 5 show results obtained when the fixed effects are 
excluded, and when all bidder-specific terms are excluded. Several features stand 
out: 
 
26Regressions were also run using the standard deviation of each bidder’s prices bid, as in the 
profitability regressions; results were similar but significance levels tended to be somewhat lower. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of the Average Price Bid 
Dependent Variable WMP WMP WMP WMP WMP WMP 
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV IV OLS 
 Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
No Fixed 
Effects 
No fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
TBBID(+1) – 0.248 0.258 0.173 0.118 –0.015 
  (0.105)* (0.073)** (0.514)** (0.059)* (0.022) 
CO – 0.312 0.200 0.192 0.160 0.382 
  (0.175)+ 0.095* (0.070)** (0.081)* (0.038)** 
TBOFF(–1) – 0.201 0.225 0.243 0.308 0.254 
  (0.079)* (0.058)** (0.035)** (0.040)** (0.026)** 
SDTBOFF 0.414 –0.168 –0.127 –0.028 0.034 0.131 
 (0.171)* (0.001) (0.095) (0.070) (0.081) (0.054)* 
ASDPBID – –0.704 –1.149 –0.821 –0.763 –0.451 
  (0.480) (0.178)** (0.127)** (0.147)** (0.073)** 
SDPBID –0.679 –0.622 – – – – 
 (0.544) (0.587)     
AV 0.258 0.005 – – – – 
 (0.113)* (0.071)     
AW/AV –4.120 –1.113 – – – – 
 (0.913)** (0.484)*     
AW(–1) –0.046 0.010 – – – – 
 (0.020)* (0.011)     
V 0.203 –0.115 –0.133 –0.026 – 0.022 
 (0.158) (0.072) (0.064)* (0.011)*  (0.015) 
W/V 3.593 1.311 – – – – 
 (0.779)** (0.373)**     
(W/V)–(AW/AV) – – 1.517 1.104 – 0.759 
   (0.367)** (0.096)**  (0.040)** 
W(–1) –0.007 –0.001 – – – – 
 (0.009) (0.004)     
AUC28 1.049 0.507 0.588 0.538 0.536 0.704 
 (0.347)** (0.187)** (0.186)** (0.145)** (0.170) (0.106)** 
No. of Observations 740 740 740 740 740 764 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
Standard Deviation of 
Dependent Variable 0.476 0.476 0.476 0.476 0.476 0.476 
R2 0.323 0.591 0.545 0.580 0.364 0.649 
Generalised R2 0.347 0.457 0.455 0.407 0.321 – 
E'PZ*E 19.128 0.735 1.021 9.126 23.474 – 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  **: significant at 1 percent; *: significant at 5 percent; +: significant at 
10 percent. 
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 • The estimated coefficients on all three price terms are significantly greater 
than zero and of similar magnitude. It would appear that bidding behaviour 
reflects a mixture of the ‘buy and sell’ and ‘buy and hold’ strategies. 
 • The coefficients on the risk measures enter with the anticipated negative 
sign and are significantly different from zero. Greater uncertainty over the 
auction outcome and the subsequent value of the bills seem to lower the 
prices bid. 
 • Bidder-specific factors are of importance, and the fixed effects are jointly 
significant.27 The coefficient on the relative share of bids accepted, which 
can be thought of as capturing a range of idiosyncratic factors, is of 
considerable magnitude and highly significantly positive. The volume bid 
by an individual enters with a negative sign; bidding a higher quantity, and 
keeping the expected win ratio unchanged, involves submitting relatively 
many low-priced bids.28 
 
Estimating the model by OLS (Column 6) has a marked effect on a number of 
parameter estimates. In particular, the coefficient on the future secondary market 
price becomes insignificant, the coefficients on the standard deviation of secondary 
market prices and the volume bid reverse sign, and the coefficients on the bid spread 
and the relative win ratio become much smaller in magnitude. The adoption of an 
instrumental variables technique to relate prices bid to expectations thus seems 
warranted. As were the regression results for the profitability equation, results are 
robust to changes in the sample [see Hardy (2000)]. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The examination of bidding behaviour during the first three years of Pakistani 
government treasury bills presented in this paper yields a number of findings. 
 • The typical pattern of bidding behaviour was established relatively quickly, 
after about five or six auctions. The secondary market became active over 
the first year of the auctions. 
 • The average profitability of participating in the auctions was positive (as 
one would expect from auction theory), but quite low in absolute terms and 
also when compared with the normal bid-ask spread in the secondary 
market. Profitability was on average higher than found in similar 
discriminatory-price auctions for government bills in other countries, but 
not unreasonably so given, in the case of Pakistan, the uncertainty over the 
 
27The test statistic of 115.528 for the hypothesis that coefficients on all the fixed effects are zero, 
with an F(47,684) distribution, is highly significant. When, alternately, dummy variables identifying 
groups of bidders were included, the estimated coefficients were insignificant. 
28The individual volume bid enters the estimated profitability equation with a positive sign, but  
the relevant sample contains only the accepted bids, which are ipso facto relatively high. 
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quantity to be sold, the relative thinness of the secondary market, and the 
absence of when-issued trading before the auctions. Average profitability 
did not differ systematically across types of bidders, which, together with 
the large number of participants, suggests that collusion was not pervasive. 
In sum, as measured by profitability of bidding, the auctions do not seem to 
have been an expensive way to raise government financing. 
 • Again, in conformity with the predictions of auction theory, expected 
profitability was higher, and the average price bid was lower, the greater the 
risks faced by bidders. These risks, which find expression primarily in the 
dispersion of bids, include in particular the uncertainty surrounding the cut-
off price that the government will select, and fluctuations in the level of 
demand for the new issue of bills. 
 • Profitability tended to be higher, the higher the aggregate demand for bills, 
as shown by the total amount bid; and lower, the greater the quantity of bills 
issued. Profitability was reduced when there was a large stock of similar 
bills outstanding in the market. These results suggest that bidding behaviour 
was inconsistent with the assumption that the value of the bills was strictly 
common to all bidders; bidding behaviour seems to have been influenced by 
considerations of desired inventory maintenance and the transaction costs of 
trading in the secondary market. 
 • Bidder-specific effects were significant. Notably, a bidder that submitted a 
relatively large volume of bids on average earned lower profits, but a bidder 
that held a relatively large stock of bills bid more aggressively and earned 
higher profits. These regularities again suggest that bidders were concerned 
to maintain a target quantity of bills in their portfolios. 
 • The average price bid in an auction was normally influenced in 
approximately equal measure by the expected post-auction secondary 
market price of the bills to be issued, and the secondary market price of old 
bills that obtained at the time the bids were formulated, in addition to the 
expected cut-off price. Thus, prices bid seemed to reflect a mixture of  ‘buy 
and sell’ and ‘buy and hold’ strategies. 
In conclusion, Pakistan seems to have been able to establish a successful primary 
market for treasury bills, and to develop an adequately liquid secondary market within the 
period considered here. The Pakistani experience gives credence to the effectiveness of 
auctions as a mechanism to determine a market-based price and allocation even under 
conditions of asymmetric market power and considerable uncertainty.  
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